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,.DRIFTING TOGETHER, NOT APARTII
Remarks by Ambassador Peter Hermes on the State of German-AmerJcan Relatlons
at the Instltute of l,lor'ld Affalrs, Universlty of WJsconsln, Milwaukee,
on May 14, 19Bz
Lad I es and Gen t'l emen ,
Today I wanted to share w'lth you my vlews on the state of German-
Amerlcan i"elatlons. Let me begln by making a rather genera'l observatlon'
which I wi'l 'l then e'laborate ln greater deta l'l :
Throughout the past year or so there appeared to be rather wide-
spread agreement by ana'lysts that the I'lestern A1'llance is in a crls'ls,
and that Germany and the United States are drlfting apart. I have never
shared this asslssment, on the contrary, I have cla'lmed, and I continue
to claim that we are in fact I'drift'ing together." Whatever problems may
exist between us, are due to the fact-that we are extremely c'lose to each
other, and not that vJe are too far apart from each other.
Some of you may feel that this ls just professional optimi$n, or an
euphem'istic firzz'lneis of a diplomat, and tnat thls'ls what can be expected
frbm an ambassador. But]et me try to explain to you w[y I thlnk that my
assessment is not dlplomat'lc wishful thinklng but obJectlve reallty.
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2Our Growlng Interdependence
The most prominent feature of German-American relatlons ls our growlng
lnterdependence. This ls true ln our economic re]ationship; lt is not'less
true in our pol itlcal relations.
Turning to the economic scene first, one thlng stands out: Germany is
a free market economy, based. on free enterprlse, with perhaps the most
llberal approach to foreign trade and lnvestment of any country in the world.
0ur ded'lcation to a free market economy has bnought unprecedented economic
growth and prosperity to Germany'in the post-war period. Wa'lther Rathenau'
German Foreign Minister in the I920's, once remarked, I'The economy is our
destiny."
Today Germany earns almost 30 percent of her GNP through international
trade;
95 percent of our energy supplies as well as most of our vital raw
materials have to be lmported.
My country is therefore heavily dependent on unimpeded trade, on the
free flow of capital, and on c1ose communications and transportation links
wlth a'l I parts of the wor'ld.
Thls fundamenta'l lnterest places us firmly on the side of those who
share our economic outlook and who are our major,trade partners. The growlng
economic interdependence wjth the United States, and wlth our partners ln
the Atlantjc Alliance, is and wjll remajn a cogent reason 1n ltself for a
c'lose and ever deepening relationship with the United States.
Economic Interdependence
But there is a'lso another aspect to economic lnterdependence; wlth such
an lmportant external sector, Germany's economy ls very much exposed to the
ups and downs of the ulorld economy, and to economic dec'lsions made by our
partners. Given the size of the U.S. economy, busJness cycles and economic
trends 'ln the United States have a much larger impact on Germany than vice
versa.
In our highly'lntegrated capita'l markets of today, wJth the U.S. dollar
represent'lng no less than 80 percent of woridwide central bank reservesf
hlgh interest rates ln the United States force interest rate'leve'ls in Ger-
many up beyond what would be warranted by domestic economic factors. At the
same tjme, the dollar as the international trade currency and by the way
overva'lued relative to the German Mark increases the cost of lmported energy'
drjves inflat'ion'ln Germany upward and forestalls the economic upswing.
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lde know, of course, that hlgh lnterest rates in this country are, tosome extent, the result of a restrictive monetary po]iiv-aesignea to reduce'lnflation.-- a goal which we certain'ly share. eri there-can bi no questionthat cont'lnued high interest rates ln the uniteo Statei cirry-significant
and negat'lve consequences for Europe and for Germany as we]l. Greater jnter-dependence thus produces 'lncreased mutual vulnerabiiity, ind enhanced sensi-tivitles on both sldes.
Un i ted Aqa'inst Pro tec ti on i sm
Simi'lar1y, our lnterests and views in internationa'l trade are very close.Both our governments are worklng actively foi i ri.e iiow-oi-gooai, iu"e,iiui---
and services. we are united in lrre f .ight- ugiinit protectioni sfr.
At the same time, there is some concern in my country about voices inthe United States advocating what may be termed a! a mi'ld-form of protec-tjonism under the guise of the we'll-lound"ing notion of reciprocity'in 'inter-
national trade. l.Je are, for example, concer[ed about efforti by the UnitedStates stee'l 'lndustry to restrict steel 'imports from iurop. wtich have risenlargely on account of the steep rise of the dollar during the last year. Ipersonally remain convinced tha! those efforts will not iucceed in ilteringthe U.s. conrmitment to free trade which we wholehearted'ly support.
Trade with Eastern Euro pe
As far as the question of trade with Eastern Europe, notably the SovietUnion, is concerned, our two governments see eye to eyb on the nLed to preventthe Soviet Union from obtaining technological advantages for the strengthen-lng of jts military potential from trading witfr the West. t.le strictly idhereto the guidelines agreed upon in CoCom prohibiting such exports, and we are
wonklng w'lth the U,S. government to rev'iew these iestrictibns in order to close
any loopholes with regard to high technology.0n this, there is full agreement
between our two governments.
It'is, however, d different question when general trade sanctions vis-a-
vis the East are being proposed. Here, we have serious reservations:
effectjve. Soviet foreign trade with Western countries, however significantit nray be for certain sectors of the Soviet economy, has never been allowed
by Sov'iet planners to have an important impact on the overall Soviet econonly.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union accords first priority to its mi'litary sector;it could shift additiona'l resources from the cjvilian to the mi'litary sector
at the expense of the consumer, probably without risking any civil unrest.
4
4The SovJet population does not behave 'l 'ike the Pojes. A'lso, ilny snbargo could
easlly be circumvented by stepped-up imports from countries not participatingin such an embargo.
Second, Europeans have a long trad'ition of separating trade from politics.
Our bus'lnessmen are accustomed and by law entitled to trading freely wlth any
country 'ln the world and without government intervention. 0ur trade wlth the
Soviet Union -- on'ly 2 percent of our total foreign trade and'in relative terms
declin'ing -- is significant only for certain sectors of our industry, such as
steel pipe production and plant equ'ipment. To forego opportunities altogether
with the East for passing po'lit'ical motives would be unpopular indeed with both
business and labor ln Germany. And let me add, in all frankness: I detect a
sim'llar react'ion ln this country when I foljow the discussions in the American
farm'lng community of the pros and cons of a grain embargo.
One more point: It may be suggested that trade with the East has indeed
helped to lmprove the general cl lmate between East and l^lest ln Europe. Germany
as a divided country, with the c'ity of Berlin hanging in a delicate balance,
has proflted from growing economjc lnterchange 'ln many v{ays, and most partic-
ular'ly in opening avenues for more communication, travel and family-reunions
between West and East. Trade with the Soviet Union, in non-strategic areas
does not confer a uni'lateral advantage to the Soviets. 0n the contrary, we
see it as beneficial to our s'ide; if that were not the case, we could not trade
at al l.
The Gas-Pi ine P ct
A case in point'ls the notorious gas-plpeline project whJch I am sure
you have been waitjng for me to discuss. Let me say here only that for a
country which is almost wholly dependent on lmporEs of its energy suppfies,
the contribution of Soviet gas to our energy ba'lance is wejcomed because'lt
wi1l tend to reduce our dependence on such h'igh risk imports as oil from the
Middle East and, for instance, Libya
Energy lndependence is an impossible goal for Germany, an il'lusion:All we can do is opt'imizing risk djstrjbution. l,lith not more than 5 percent
of our overall energy consumption to be imported from the Soviet Union once
the new Sov'iet gas comes on stream jn the late B0's, we feel we will be
better off than t,/e are today. 0f course, precautionary measures wil'l be taken
'in order to safeguard for any adverse eventuality, and to protect us against
any potential Soviet blackmailing attempt
Let me sum up: 0ur fundamenta'l economic goal s are JdentJca'|. 0ccaslonal
disputes about tactics, about specific econom'ic poljcies cannot overshadow
that basic unity of purpose. The real problem jn manag'lng our economic re'la-
tjonshjp is to take into account correctly and timely the inlnedlate effects
which unjlateral domestic economjc decjsions in one country have upon economic
deve'lopnents in the other.
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5In the European Conrmunity, this has been a we'll observed phenomenon overtfe past 20 years, and we have taken action by adopting the oniy remedy tothis problem: Better and closer coordination 6f economic and monetary ilolicies.It seems to me, ladies and gentlemen, that the transatlantic economil ie'la-
tio_nship has now also reached a polnt where we must seriously undertake an
effort to better coordinate economic policjes.
As Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said the other day with regard to thisyearrs Economic Summit, to be held in June in Versai'lles, Frince, and I quote:
,lt is'lnd'lspensable that consideration be g'iven to the'international
effects of one's own national econom'ic policy and that any kind of beggar-
:thy-rgighbor po1 icy be renounced. l,lr'th the so'le exception of the Peopli's
Republ ic of Chinar [o rrldjor country in the wor]d is any 'longer able to cope
with jts economic problems in nat'ional iso'lation. Every country is dependent
upon the functjoning of international trade and financial relations."
Some Political Questions
Let me now turn to some political questions. Those of you who have been
fo'l'low'ing European-Anerican, and German-Anerican, re'lations over the pastyear or so will have noticed the many headlines in the media deplorlng what
was perceived to be a growing rift ln the Alliance.
It became rather fashionable to quote headlines such as "The Germanl'lalaise," "The German Disconnection," or "The German Problem.I As recently as
a couple of months ago, this perception had become so strong in the United
States that I had no cho'ice but to deliver speeches with the title "Are wedrifting apart?"
0f course, nty answer was "No" theni it ls I'Norr today, and in my case has
-- I think -- become a bit easier to make in recent weeks. A German TV-corres-
pondent to]d me iust the other day that an hour-long feature which thqy were
Planning on prob'lems in the Alliance, and which had tentatively been titled
"Cris"is in the Alliance" has now been retitled simply: "0ur Alliance." What
has happened?
My answeris that pol itical interdependence between our countries has
grown just as much as our economic interdependence, and that, not un]ike eco-
nom'ic trends, pol itical trends in our two cpuntries are not a'lways well syn-
chronlzed. What do I mean by that?
Today, as in the mid-60's, problems in our relationship arise from time
to time because one partner ho'lds on to an established policy which he con-
tinues to feel comfortable with, whi'le the other partner has come to the
conclus'ion that that pol icy is no longer workable and needs major revision.
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Interesting'ly enough, our respective positions in the mid-1960rs were
more or'less the opposlte of what they were last year: Then, at a time when
the Unjted States and the Soviet Union had already declded to embark upon
a course of detente, the Federal Republic of Germany held on to po1'lcies 
-
adopted and proven useful 1n the decade before. In fact, the Federal Repub'llc
of Germany ohty belatedly and with some effort managed to iump aboard the
East-West detente train in the 1960's.
Last year, the same phenomenon occurred'in reverse: As we Germans con-
tinued to iojd on to defense.and detente as the established policy of the
All'iance sjnce 1967 when the so-called Harmel-Report was adopted, the Un'ited
States felt compel'led to modify th'is course in favor of a more comprehensive
effort to contain Soviet expansjonism.
The Ant'i-Nuclear Movement
As the Aunerican commitment to higher defense spending grew 'ln 1980 and
1981, concerns and fears in Europe regarding an East-West confrontation'
and iegarding the dangers of nuclear war began to mount. [.Jhile there were
Anrericin voiies suggeiting the need to prepare for a confrontation wlth the
Soviet Union, possiUty inituding a nuclear exchange, anti-nuclear peace
demonstrations attracied large irowds throughout Europe in the fa'l'l of 1981.
Thus the notion of "driftin
United States, committed to the
Europe, perceived as growing wea
and almost overwhelmed bY Pacifi
of "instant analysis," totallY 1
g apart" was born: 0n the one side was the
defense of the West; on the other s'ide was
ker, seemingly prone to appeasement policies'
st and neutralist sentiment. That was a case
acking historical Perspective.
Today, on'ly a few months later, the anti-nuclear movement in the United
States is,-of course, just as strong and as outspoken-a po1itical force asit has beeryin Europe ior the last year and a ha'lf. All of a sudden, I am no
longer being asked lo explain the motives and the rat'ionale of the German
peaie nrovement, but I am asked by Americans whether Germany is for or against
the nuclear freeze movement in the U.S.
This phenomenon which I can best describe as a lack of synchronization
of po'litjcil trends in our two counLries is particularly tnoublesome because
our two countrjes are polit'ically so closely tied to each other.
7
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Ge ns Perceive Thsnse'lves as art of the constituen of the U S. President
. 
Referring to last year's perception of the Alliance drifting apart I am
reminded of the saying: "For last year's words belong to last year,s'language
and this year's words await another voice." Americani, I think, have not
a]ways been sufficiently aware of the fact that the Germans peiceive of them-
selves as being part of the constituency of the Unjted Statei Presldent, cer-tainly as far as the cormon defense of the Alliance is concerned.
i n rea'l I ty noth 1ng 1 es s
e Federal Repub'lic of
n Germany and regarded as
in peace and security.
From this flows, of course, that the United States government should,in making major foreign policy decisions, not on'ly consJier the interests oftheir constituents ln M'innesota, Utah, or Delawarb; t,Iashington must also be
aware sf the potential repercussions in Europe. Thls will, of course, a'lways
be a difficult pofitica'l act, even lf we had perfectly harmonized politicai
trends in our two countries.
But with the lack of po'litical synchronization the prob'lem has become
compounded. I am not sure there'is any clearcut so]ut'ion to it; but I have
been urging, and I will cont'inue to urge that A.rnerican policyrakers take into
account the potential impact of their actions and speeches on the Europeanpublic of whatever measure they are cons'iderjng on this side of the Atlantic.Thls 1s particu]arly true in the defense area where we continue to be dependent
on the security umbre'l'la provided to us by the United States.
0ur close relatlonship with the United States is
than an unwritten amendment to the constitution of th
Germqny. It is something which is taken for granted .i
an essential precondition of our continued existence
At the same time, we should also be more aware of the extrao
degree to which public and political trends in our two countries
influence each other. The peace movement is a case in point: Last
hardly anyone in the United States spoke of the nuclear freeze as
signiflcant po'litical issue, while Europeans spoke of the dangers
war. Today, of course, the movement has crossed the Atlantic and,
rd i nary
tend to
year,
a real and
of nucl ear
at I eastfor some time, our two governments seem to be facing identical challenges
again: Drjfting together, not drifting apart.
Partners with Shared Id ls and Different Views in Matters of Detail
Chance'l'lor Schmidt, in a recent speech before the Bundestag sa'id the
fol i owi ng:
"But surely there is no doubt that Amerjcans and Europeans are not
identical twins with Jdentical behavior at all times and al1 places. Rather,
they are partners w'ith shared ideals, witn joint fundamental jnterests but
also wlth very different views and Jnterests 1n matters of deta'i1. They are
B
-8-
********
partners who time and again must seek coordination and are able to do so,
because they are c'lose'ly 'l lnked not only hjstorical'ly and politica'l1y and not
only economically and militarily, but by conmon value concepts of democracy,
individual freedom and peace,l'
What we on both sides of the At'lantic u'ltimately share is not only a
common interest in defense or even the strong economic ties whJch bind us
together. Our main tie is the message of hope and progress provided by the
democratic idea'l. I am quite certain that young people on both sides of theAtlantic share many of the same hopes and aspirations.
We have to promote understanding between our two nations, in particular
between our younger generations. Th'is is of course not solely the responsi-bi'lity of d'iplomats and governments. Individua'ls and private groups such as
the Council of World Affairs here in Milwaukee deserve our pralse and recog-
nit'ion for their contribution to better international understanding, and to
the partnership between Germany and the Un'ited States.
Thank you for your interest, and thank you for your attention.
